The logic of economic inquiry requires two distinct research programs. One program treats economic life in terms of invariant formal categories across time and place. The other program treats the continual of novelty and turbulence through time through human interaction. These programs are not commensurable: one can't be reduced to the other. The former program must be conveyed by a theory of equilibrium; the latter program requires a processbased theory of emergent phenomena. Where Roy Weintraub articulated a neoWalrasian research program in his General Equilibrium Analysis, here I sketch a complementary neo-Mengerian program. In presenting this sketch, I also explain that needless analytical confusion and antagonism can result from a failure to recognize that economic analysis requires two distinct research programs. As a historical side-bar, Carl Menger probably recognized this situation, as evidenced by his correspondence with Léon Walras.
A distinct research program can be developed around each orientation and with both programs being valid explorations of their domains of inquiry.
These alternative programs, however, are not competitive with one another; rather they are non-commensurable. The two programs do not represent contestation over the same territory but cover distinct but tangential aspects of social life, much as illustrated by the two parabolas X 2 and -X 2 , sharing a common origin but pointing in opposite directions. I shall designate these research programs as neo-Walrasian and neo-Mengerian because the terms are in common use and map into the common distinction between neo-classical and Austrian economics, though I am not fully comfortable with this nomenclature for reasons that will be noted below.
Roy Weintraub (1993) articulates a neo-Walrasian research program, noting that this program was not created by Léon Walras but rather emerged through scholarly interaction among economists, many of them Austrian, who sought to pursue the program of general interdependence that Walras (1874) sketched. The neo-Walrasian program seeks to advance claims that are valid independently of any particularities of time and place. We can all recognize the truth that there is nothing new under the sun. But we can also recognize the truth of the claim that we can't even step twice into the same river. The alternative, neo-Mengerian research program seeks to articulate how the temporal experience of life varies with time and place through interaction among economizing people. Among other things, much needless analytical confusion and antagonism has resulted from the failure to recognize that logic of economic theory requires two distinct but non-commensurable research programs. As a historical side-bar, it is worth noting that Carl Menger (1871)(1883) probably recognized this bivalent setting for economic theory, as evidenced by his correspondence with Walras. When Walras asserted to Menger that both shared a common interest in changing the direction of economic scholarship, Menger responded that: "There is indeed a resemblance between us. There is an analogy of concepts on certain points but not on the deeper questions. 
Alternative Research Programs for Economic Theory
A focus on eternal validity independent of time and place generates a distinct research program from a focus on the emergence of particular societal configurations at particular times and places. I describe these alternative research programs as neo-Walrasian and neo-Mengerian. To be sure, the dichotomy I have in mind extends beyond those Léon Walras (1874) and Carl
Menger (1871)(1883) and the traditions they represent. For instance, the neoMengerian program was present in the theories of spontaneous order we associate with the Scottish Enlightenment (Daiches, Jones, and Jones 1986) .
Similarly, the neo-Walrasian program was present in much preceding theologically-oriented scholarship that sought to articulate the order of creation (Viner 1972 The distinction between the neo-Walrasian and the neo-Mengerian research programs should not be assimilated directly and immediately to some dichotomy between neoclassical and Austrian economics which is often given play (compare, for instance Rosen (1997) and Yeager (1997) Gloria-Palermo (1999) explains. Both the neo-Walrasian and the neo-Mengerian programs are reasonable objects of scholarly inquiry, but they are different, non-commensurable programs. While they share a common origin in generalized interdependence among economic phenomena, they point in opposing analytical directions: one toward phenomena that are independent of time and the other toward the generation of phenomena that emerge through time and so vary across place.
The neo-Walrasian Program. The neo-Walrasian research program construes an economy as an equilibrated system of fully connected markets that can be separated into product markets where goods and services are exchanged and factor markets where inputs are obtained and incomes earned. A disturbance in the market for one product will also affect the market for other products, as well as the market for inputs used in the production of products.
This framework provides a sharp sketch of the interrelated character of economic activity within a society; it shows crisply how changes at one point in the nexus of economic relationships will induce changes elsewhere in that nexus. what seem to be the bedrock presumptions held in common by a large body of economists who produce scholarly works within a neo-Walrasian motif. The central point, in any case, is that any scholarly work will have some such accepted hard core that provides the point of departure for that work; any system of thought must contain exogenous variables. (1) theories should contain agents who optimize and (2) theories should make predictions about changes in equilibrium states in response to specified exogenous changes in parameters. A similar articulation of a positive heuristic was articulated by Reder (1982) , who argued that economic models should be based on two presumptions: (1) agents maximize and (2) There is a parallel in this respect with object-oriented programming, as In the spirit of Weintraub (1993) , Table 2 It is with the final two elements that the largest differences seem to appear. Element #5 of the neo-Walrasian hard core holds that agents have all the necessary knowledge necessary to solve their optimization problems, whereas for the neo-Mengerian program knowledge is incomplete within any single agent and is distributed among agents. This element prevents any reduction of society to a representative agent, for the way that knowledge is used depends on the particular networked structure of society that is in place.
Element #6 of the neo-Walrasian program claims that observations are of coordinated equilibria, so that meaning can be derived from a snapshot. In contrast, the comparable element #6 of the neo-Mengerian program claims that observations at some instant are but slices of some unfolding process, so that meaning is derived not from observation but from interpretation of actions and plans. This element embraces temporality to accommodate the internal generation of societal transformation, not as equilibrated responses to postulated exogenous shocks but as intelligible facets of economizing action.
With respect to Weintraub's two positive heuristics for the neo-Walrasian program, the neo-Mengerian program seems similar on the first heuristic and divergent on the second. Where the neo-Walrasian program theorizes in terms of agents optimizing over known options, the neo-Mengerian program theorizes about agents acting to implement plans that can be only incompletely articulated because the effect of any plan will depend on the future circumstances that will be influenced by future knowledge, which, in turn, will change through continuing human action as time passes. This alternative formulation is necessary to accommodate the internal generation of societal change.
It is the second positive heuristic where the more significant difference would seem to appear between the two programs. The neo-Walrasian program holds that theoretical statements should refer to changes in equilibrium states.
This follows from the sixth hard core proposition that all observations are of equilibrium states. Distinct observations refer to distinct equilibrium states, and this presumption advises use of the positive heuristic to make predictions about the effect of changes in exogenous variables on equilibrium states. In contrast, the neo-Mengerian program does not postulate that observations are of equilibrium states, but rather are blips on a screen whose pattern can be discerned only with the passing of time. Theories start from planning agents, as illustrated by the first positive heuristic, but the entire set of agents is never fully coordinated. To the contrary, plans continually are being revised or abandoned.
Among other things, institutional arrangements arise to facilitate the revision and abandonment of plans (Lachmann 1971) , and the neo-Mengerian counterpart to the second positive heuristic would counsel the construction of theories that, while consistent with agent planning, render intelligible the on-going generation of the institutional framework that governs human action and interaction (Mises 1957 ).
Ontology, Epistemology, and Social-Economic Theory
Both the neo-Walrasian and the neo-Mengerian programs theorize about generally orderly patterns of human activity. The objects of theorizing, however, differ between the programs, with one focusing on eternity and the other on temporality. Needless controversy and confusion can arise when there is incongruity between a program and the object of examination, as when a framework suitable to invariance across time and place is used to explore variability across time and place. Before exploring this point for two concrete economic situations, I shall I shall use a different setting to frame the priority of ontology over epistemology with respect to social theory. To be sure, a purely instrumentalist view of science would seem to elevate epistemology over ontology: the degree of congruity between a theory and its object, which is a matter of ontology, is irrelevant because what matters is the degree of congruity between theoretical prediction and observed experience, which is a matter of epistemology. 5 Any analytical framework that distinguishes between universal principles and particular instances of those principles that can take on multiple guises is one that will involve both process and structure. Structure speaks to the What is present here is confusion between ontology and epistemology with respect to different social configurations. The parade is constituted as an organization; the spectators are constituted as an order. Each configuration can differ in the degree of coordination it exhibits. In some parades all participants might march in step and play in tune and on key, while other parades might display various degrees of cacophony. On some occasions the crowd of spectators might dissipate relatively quickly with everyone reaching their desired destinations pretty much as they had hoped, while other occasions might involve shoving, scuffles, and numerous cases of missed rides and late arrivals.
A theorist who was asked to explain the variation in coordination among parades would surely take resort to such considerations as the musical and marching abilities of the members, the instructional talents of the conductor, and the amount of effort given to rehearsal. Such categories as these, however, are irrelevant to explaining the degree of coordination among spectators.
Explanation of this alternative type of coordination would involve such things as conventions, customs, and moral character. Epistemological questions can be addressed both to organizations and to orders, but the character of those questions depends on which type of object is being examined.
Both the parade and the crowd of spectators contain structure and can be described as an arrangement of nodes and connections among nodes. Those structures would be constituted differently, however, and those differences refer to processes by which those configurations are constituted. The parade is constituted through plans of a conductor or marshal. The crowd of spectators is constituted through each member's seeking to secure timely arrival at some destination while mostly conforming reasonably well to the similar actions of the other members of the crowd.
The neo-Mengerian program seeks to explore the on-going emergence of those social configurations that conform to the template offered by the image of crowds of spectators. In contrast, the Neo-Walrasian program holds that there are certain eternal features that pertain to all crowds. After all, at 5,000 feet crowds of spectators bear family resemblances to parades. Yet those crowds also vary across time and place, and the neo-Mengerian program seeks to give an account of the internal generation of such variability, even while recognizing that there is a surface-level resemblance between the two social configurations, as denoted by fourth element of the two hard cores held in common. For instance, it is impossible to work with a formulation wherein people generate and reform continually the world they experience and the same time work with a model of competitive equilibrium where everyone is a price taker. These alternative analytical windows are not so much antagonistic as they are noncommensurable. The existence of prices is a universal feature of social life, as are differences in prices among objects of trade. It is also true that there is immense variability in the objects of trade across time and place, as conveyed brilliantly by Georg Simmel's (1900) treatment of the changing sphere of alienability in property-governed relationships, the understanding of which requires employment of emergence-based concepts and categories. In the remainder of this paper I will offer two brief comparisons that highlight the noncommensurable character of the research programs, one of which is a standard topic from micro theory and the other from macro theory.
Comparison #1: Statics, Dynamics, and Market Theory
Such concepts as preference, choice, and cost can be used to explain characteristic patterns of economic activity that are independent of time and place. Figure 1 presents a common illustration of this point, and at the same time can also be used to illustrate the non-commensurability of the neoWalrasian and the neo-Mengerian programs. Within a neo-Walrasian framework, Figure 1 illustrates the standard comparative statics of alternative equilibrium states in light of differences in given data. As compared with point α in the two panels, point β pertains to a stronger preference to X relative to Y. In Panel A this appears as a stronger demand for X; in Panel B it appears as an alternative position on the production-possibility frontier. Figure 1 illustrates a response to a "what if" type of question. It answers that the structure of production would differ if preferences were those described by α than if they were those described by β.
In other words, Figure 1 pertains to the timeless world of logic and asserts that different patterns of production will correspond to different patterns of preference.
To be sure, it is possible to use interpretative language to give the appearance of dynamic or historical relevance, as illustrated by Samuelson's Absent some articulation of new demand conditions prior to any action to engage in production, production decisions are made by entrepreneurs who act on beliefs about future market opportunities within their field of vision and who act now to capture those opportunities when they arrive, if, indeed, they do arrive (Kirzner (1973 (Kirzner ( )(1985 ). Furthermore, there is no process of assignment that assures that just the right capacity will be added. Figure 1 might correspond to five additional firms producing X. But ten firms might seek to enter the market, in which case some entrepreneurial plans will fail and will be revised or even abandoned. Among other things, this means that conflicts will arise among firms, and also that social processes and procedures will emerge to settle such conflicts as those that arise through bankruptcy and insolvency (Wagner 2007) .
Within the neo-Mengerian orientation, the generation of such market formations would occupy the foreground of analytical attention. Those formations, moreover, are largely emergent products of interaction and not direct objects of choice-and most certainly are not taken as given data. 
Comparison #2: Austrian-style Macro Theory
Austrian cycle theory (ACT) has been nearly invisible within macrotheoretic discourse since the 1930s. This invisibility does not reflect empirical weakness but rather illustrates the non-commensurability of the neo-Mengerian and neo-Walrasian research programs. ACT is commonly expressed within a neo-Walrasian framework, with an initial equilibrium being disturbed by a credit expansion that drives the market rate of interest below the natural rate. What results is a two-stage form of comparative statics, wherein an initial boom in the capital-goods industries turns into a bust because consumers have not reduced their desire to buy consumer goods (Garrison 2001) . Robert Lucas's (1975) model of the islands was actually a variation of ACT, and Lucas abandoned his support for this construction once he realized it did not fit within the neoWalrasian program that he embraced.
The problem with ACT is not that it is wrong but that it has been conveyed with intellectual vehicles that are not suited to the task (Wagner 1999) . It is unfortunate in this respect that ACT has often been conveyed in comparative static fashion, for this treatment invited its assimilation to the neo-Walrasian program where it has no room to work. Comparative statics is independent of time. In contrast, any sequential analysis that is real and not merely notional must incorporate pertinent phenomena that are associated with the passing of time. ACT has always been conveyed in sequential fashion, but the neoWalrasian orientation reduces that sequence to something purely notional. ACT can be rendered sensible only by working within a neo-Mengerian framework denoted by an evolving ecology of plans. A plan can be portrayed as a directed graph extending into the future from some point of origin. Figure 3 illustrates what I have in mind. The line designated "Actor's Plan" shows four nodes connected by intervals. This description in terms of nodes and intervals is intended to represent several relevant features concerning plans and their execution. One is that they extend from the present into the future. Hence, entrepreneurial action involves a projection from present onto future, as illustrated by Butos and Koppl (1993) . Another feature is a distinction between plans and the execution of plans. Plans have a point of initial formulation, and can also be subject to amendment or revision. Amendment, however, is not something continuous. It is discrete. The first node in the actor's plan portrayed by Figure 3 insertions that leads to flexibility, assessment, and revision being part of any plan. In the temporal sense depicted in Figure 3 , the line segments between nodes constitute a type of short run where a plan is operated on a type of automatic pilot, so to speak, until judgments have been made to revise the plan.
The long run in this conceptualization constitutes some planning horizon that provides navigational guidance, as represented by that final node in Figure 3 . conditions. Each such snapshot corresponds to sets of given data that are assumed to undergird the particular equilibrium snapshot that is being viewed.
In contrast, no such distinction is coherent at the societal level within the neo-Mengerian program, even though it is sensible at the individual level. The distinction between short run and long run has no referent when it is applied to society because there is no sentient creature who acts by creating and revising plans. At any date on a calendar, there will be some entrepreneurs who are initiating plans, there will be other entrepreneurs who are letting their plans operate, and there will be yet other entrepreneurs who are revising and even abandoning plans. At any particular moment we would expect the preponderance of enterprises to the operating somewhere along the execution interval of their plans. For instance, suppose that 95 percent of enterprises are operating within their execution phases, leaving five percent of enterprises at nodal positions where they are either creating or revising plans. This kind of situation would generate observations that would fit with the reasonably predictive properties of models of static equilibrium, as most enterprises would appear to be flying on automatic pilot. The hypothesis that observations pertained to a stationary state would pass an ordinary significance test, even though the process that generated that observation was one of emergent dynamics.
Those 95 percent of firms that at any instant are operating within their execution phases would appear to be acting consistently with a model of static equilibrium. The empirical success of static equilibrium modeling surely fits this situation. A scientific procedure that considers explanatory success in terms of averages, moreover, will be forced into making such a conclusion. To avoid such a conclusion, it is necessary to consider the entire population of enterprises and plans, and with especial attention given to outliers, and outliers of two forms.
One form is the incipient enterprise that is just entering the enterprise ecology.
The other form is the presence of creativity and plan revision within established enterprises, for we should never think that creativity comes only from new enterprises. The point is rather that in terms of a dichotomy between creative and routine, the preponderance of activity is routine and not creative. Indeed, the very notion of a plan as involving some duration of time between initiation and completion requires such preponderance. Furthermore, the observation that the world confronts us mostly as familiar from day to day is congruent with this preponderance as well. Yet there is surely a link between incipient creativity and static continuation, in that those static enterprises that do not respond to relevant developments within the nexus will lose standing and become candidates for death, whether through dissolution or takeover. What this suggests is that the appropriate grammar to apply to the nexus is the grammar that is appropriate to incipient enterprises (including the creative margins of established enterprises).
At any instant within the ecology of enterprises there are some firms that are on their death beds while there are other firms that are in the throes of birth.
Credit injection, moreover, does not operate as some uniformly-spread liquid, but comes in lumps to particular enterprises (Horwitz 2000) . Within this alternative frame of reference, a credit expansion may well facilitate some firms that prove to be successful, as well as exerting subsequent negative consequences. The overall impact, thus, cannot be captured only by some time series of aggregate measures, for those aggregates are composed of structural elements whose components are subject to variation.
The truly central feature of ACT is cousin to claims about the impossibility of collective planning. Idealize for a moment a catallaxy that is fully privately ordered. In standard equilibrium thinking, any aggregate measure of activity would show a flat line to indicate the steady state quality of the model. Catallaxy modeled in non-equilibrium fashion would not give any flat-line portrayal in the aggregate. Enterprises don't die instantly, to be replaced by new ones, again instantly. Not all plans mesh fully. Sometimes they collide, with debris scattered about. We speak of a construction industry, but a good chunk of that activity is devoted to remodeling and renovation, which in turn are activities that make sense only in the presence of failed plans that require reformation and revision.
Some degree of variability is surely to be expected as a normal feature of a wellordered catallaxy-although it is not at all clear what kind of aggregate indicator could be used to express this idea, since the customary aggregates are sensible only in light of a presumption of equilibrium (similar to any comparison between parades and crowds of spectators).
In neo-Walrasian theorizing, much is made about the presumption that the mean forecast error is zero. This means that people are not systematically wrong, so that the claim of equilibrium appears to be sensible. Such an argument could be used to claim that it doesn't matter if particular entrepreneurs judge wrongly so long as the mean error is zero. This widespread claim is one more illustration of how a presumption of equilibrium neuters structure. The situation would be examined differently from within a neo-Mengerian framework because structure matters and does important work (or at least reflects important work). Most significantly, it means that a mean forecast error of zero means nothing. If there is any work to be done by such a statistic, it is to be done by the variance and not the mean, and it does so because the variance points to
structure. An increase in error means an increased volume of particular lines of subsequently ill-fated commercial activity. These failed lines of activity have particular shape: people acquire special skills and fabricate particular tools and equipment. While these can always be redeployed, typically this will be only at some loss as compared with what would have been the case had the original plans worked out successfully.
A Concluding Observation
One long-standing aphorism goes "the more things change the more they stay the same." There is much wisdom in this conjunction of Heraclites and
Ecclesiastes. There are principles that govern the permanent things of social life, and the neo-Walrasian research program is suitable for illuminating some of those invariant features of social life, showing us again and again that no matter how much things change they do yet remain the same. And yet they do also change, and they change not because of exogenous shocks but because people continually generate change through interaction in their pursuit of plans. Plans reside in the world of intentional action, and intentional action is possible because the world is reasonably intelligible, perhaps reaching in the limit a neoWalrasian equilibrium. But this limit speaks to eternity and we are caught in temporality, and thereby are mutually engaged in a process of generating through interaction the world we are about to experience. The neo-Mengerian program is the research program that is suitable for addressing the spontaneously generated patterns of order that emerge through interaction among myriad intentionalities that inhabit the ecology of plans that constitutes a society.
Economic research has room for both types of research program, but it is also necessary that the phenomena studied be matched suitably to the appropriate research program; otherwise, weird claims can arise, as illustrated by suggestions that "lemons" will destroy the market for used cars when we know differently. The experience of obtaining lemons will do no such thing, and rather will elicit a stream of efforts to create such things as new organizational and contractual forms that will expand the extent of the market. It is the neoMengerian program that is the suitable framework for exploring the continual insertion of novelty into society, even though the future societal patterns that emerge can always be rendered intelligible in terms of the neo-Walrasian categories. Complementary Plans
